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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KIM L. NORRIS, LEX R. NORRIS, and 
LANNY T. NORRIS, d/b/a L.K.L. 
ASSOCIATES, a partnership, and 
TAYLOR NATIONAL REAL ESTATE, a 
corporation, 
Pl&intiffe and Appellanta, 
v. 
A. M. ANDERSON and NORA S. ANDERSON, 
h~sband and wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Caae No. 15718 
This is an action to compel specific performance of an 
alleged agreement for the sale of real property or, in the 
alternative, for payment of a real estate commission. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court found in favor of defendants, held 
that no contract was formed, and dismissed the Complaint of 
plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and appellants respectfully request that this 
Court affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At all times material hereto, the plaintiffs and appellants, 
Kim L. Norris, Lex R. Norris, and Lanny T. Norris, were brothers 
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and partners doing business as a partnership under the natne anal 
style of L.k.L. Associates, and the plaintiff and appellant, 
Taylor National Real Estate, was a corporation doing business 
as a real ~t;tate agency, with its principal place '.of business 
located in Orem, Utah. At all times material hereto, the defe 
ants and respondents, A .M. Anderson and Nora S. Anderson, were 
husband and wife, residing in Orem, Utah. 
On SeI)lember 10, 1976, the Andersons entered into a Sales 
Agency Conttact with Boley Realty, Inc., of American Fork, 
Utah, for ~bltiple listing of a tract of land whicH they 
owned in OrQm, Utah. Dean Hall, salesman for Boley Realty, 
int:., prepafed the listing agreement (Exhibit "l") i which 
' specified a total sales price of $250,000.00, with a down payin 
of $40,000.do, and terms for the payment of the balance tbbe 
negotiated ~ith the sellers. (Tr., pp. 11-12, 116) 
On Friday, January 7, 1977, the plaintiffs, L.K.L. 
Associates, by and through their agent, Bryce Taylor, sal~smah 
foi- the plaintiff, Taylor National Real Estate, made an offer 
putchase the property. (Exhibit "2") Said offer ddmittedly 
did not comfHy with the terms of the listing, in that it con-
sisted of $5 ,000. 00 down and $15 ,000. 00 payable on January 301 
1977, or oniy one-half of the down payment required by the 
listing agr~ement, and it contained various other differihg 
terms and conditions. (Tr. pp. 40, 95) 
On Sattirday, January 8, 1977, Bryce Tayidr and Dean Hall 
met with the Andersons to present the offer. At that time, 
~ . 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (E!xhibit "2"1 
-2-
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was complete through the signature of L.K.L. Associates 
on line 57. (Tr., pp. 12, 26, 95, 117) Because the terms of 
this offer were at variance with the terms of the listing 
agreement, and because of the size and nature of the transaction, 
the Andersons wanted some time to evaluate and consider it. 
(Tr. , pp. 2 7 , 9 5 , 118) 
After due consideration, Mr. Anderson rejected plain-
tiffs' offer outright. (Tr., pp. 13, 95) 
On the morning of Tuesday, January 11, 1977, the Andersons 
met with Mackey Boley and Dean Hall and reviewed the plaintiffs' 
offer. Being concerned with the ability of the Norris 
brothers to perform, and not wanting to release title to 
the land before it was paid for, nor to accept a second 
m~rtgage upon land which they already owned outright, all of 
which were conditions of the plaintiffs' offer, the Andersons 
formulated a counter-offer consisting of seven points, which 
was drafted at the office of Boley Realty, Inc. in American 
Fork on that day. (Tr. , pp. 13, 95, 118-119) 
In the afternoon of that same day (Tuesday, January 11, 
1977), Dean Hall met with Bryce Taylor, the plaintiffs', 
Norris's agent, at the Andersons' home to present the counter-
offer. At that time, a separate page incorporating the 
I seven points of the defendants' counter-offer was attached 
to plaintiffs' original offer, and now appears as page two 
of Exhibit "2". After conununicating to and reviewing the 
terms of the defendants' counter-offer with Bryce Taylor, 
Mr. Anderson crossed out lines 48 through 55 on page one of 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Exhibit "2" (plaintiffs' original offer), the samE1 being 
unacceptabl~ to him. 
At the Andersons' direction, Bryce Taylor then wrote 
the handwritten language which appears below line 57 on 
page one of txhibit "2" (plaintiffs' original offed, as 
follows: 
Seller lgrees to the terms above stated with 
the indbrporation df the seven points outlined 
on the,~ttached arnrnendment [sic.] sheet. Subject 
to buyet's acceptance within five days. (Emphasis 
aodea. 1 
Mr. and Mrs~ Atiderson then each signed both pages ~f Exhitiit 
"2", and Mrl Anderson dated both pages on that date, January 
11 1 1977. l~r., pp. 13~14, 28-29, 41-42, 95-97, 119~120) 
Upon cdfupletion of the defendants' counter-offer, 
Mi'. Andersod handed it to Dean Hall, .who in turn handed it 
td_ Bryce Ta:fior •. (Tr., pp. 15-16) Bryce Taylor, ha-Virig 
', . I, 
b~~n engageJ. by tHe Norris brothers as their agent hq c6tnniuni· 
cate with Bdley t~alty, Inc., the listing agency, ad4 Dean 
Hall, its sJiesman, in all matters relative to the purchase 
'I 
of thel prop~tty, and having presented their original offer 
to the deferiaants, then took the defendants' countet~offet, 
Exhibit "2" j to the Norris brothers for their consi.deratidn. 
(Tr., pp. 24~30) 
Bryce ~.ylor was urtsure as to when he presented the 
defendants' bounter-offelr to the Norris brothers. (Tr., ~P· 
29-30) On Friday, January 14, 1977, L.K.L. Associates, by 
and through tum L. Norris, allegedly accepted five of the 
seven points of the Andersons' counter-offer. This qualified 
-4-
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acceptance was handwritten beneath the signatures of the 
Andersons on their counter-offer, at page two of Exhibit 
"2", and was made expressly subject to the following condi-
tions: 
Buyer agrees to counter-offer subject to deletion 
of 50' easement and subject to seller's acceptance 
of second mortgage provision contained in original 
offer. (Emphasis added.) 
This qualified and conditional acceptance was apparently 
then signed by Kim L. Norris and dated on that date, January 
14, 1977 (Exhibit "2"; Tr., pp. 30, 42-43, 72-73), but was 
never at that time delivered to the defendants in written 
form. 
After obtaining the plaintiffs' qualified and conditional 
acceptance of the defendants' counter-offer, Bryce Taylor 
called Dean Hall to advise him of that development, and to 
arrange a new meeting with the Andersons. Dean Hall, in 
turn, conununicated verbal notice of the plaintiffs', Norris's, 
conditional acceptance of the defendants' counter-offer to 
the Andersons, informing them that two of the seven points 
of their counter-offer were unacceptable to L.K.L. Associates 
(Norris brothers) and arranged to discuss the matter with 
them on the following day. (Tr., pp. 16, 30, 44-45, 97, 
120-121) 
The next evening, Saturday, January 15, 1977, Bryce 
Taylor and Dean Hall met again at the Andersons' home. At 
that time, Mr. Taylor attempted to persuade the Andersons to 
delete the two points of their counter-offer which the Norris 
brothers had found unacceptable. Mr. Anderson was adamant 
-5-
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in stating that he would not delete those two· points from his 
counter-off~r, and that the counter-offer had to be accepted 
by the Norris brothers exactly ~written. 
9b-99, 104-iosi 111-112, 113, 121-122> 
(Tr., ptJ. 16-b, 
Mr. Anderson told Bryce Taylor that the Norris brothers 
still had otte day left before the expiration of the five-day 
·1 
time limit tJn the counter-offer, made on Tuesday, .;·anuary 11, 
1977, and that he would honor his conunitment until, that 'time, 
(Tt&, pp. 104-105, 113) However, Mr. Anderson did not on 
that date sie or receive the written, qualified, and condi-
tional acceptance allegedly obtained by Bryce Taylor.from 
L.K.L. Associates the day before. The meeting endei:i.1 with 
no agreemen~ reached, and no definite arrangements ~ere nJae 
tb meet agalh. (Tr. , pp. 17, 44, 46, 99, 121-122, b4-136) 
On Monday, January 17, 1977, Dean Hall called Mr. Anci.erso• 
tb determinS how he felt about the purported qualified and 
cbhditional hcceptance of his counter-offer. Mr. Ahd~rsorl 
refused to b~nd on either of the two points of his codnter-
offer, and teiterated that he would only accept it as 
written and $ubmitted. (Tr., pp. 122, 137) On the same 
day (January 17, 1977), Mr. Hall called Bryce Tayior and 
conveyed this information to him. Mr. Taylor replied, "~ 
Norris brothl!rs can do no ~·" (Tr.~ pp. 34 .... 35t 47, 122-12li 
i 
137-138) 
Dean Hail then called Mr. Anderson back, and informed 
him of Bryce Taylor's words, "The Norris brothers <!:an do no 
more." Mr. Anderson then told Dean Hall that the counter-
-6-
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offer had expired, and that the deal was off. He did not 
say that he would stand on the counter-offer on that day. 
(Tr., pp. 18-20) 
On Tuesday, January 18, 1977, seven days after the 
defendants' counter-offer was presented, Bryce Taylor called 
Dean Hall back and informed him that the Norris brothers 
wanted to accept the Andersons' counter-offer. (Tr., pp. 
35-36, 123-124) Mr. Taylor had earlier conferred with the 
Norris brothers, who, by and through Lanny T. Norris, had 
apparently lined out the language of their qualified and 
conditional acceptance on page two of Exhibit "2", and had 
written beneath it, "Buyer accepts counter-offer as written." 
Lanny T. Norris then allegedly signed and dated the document 
on that day, January 18, 1977. (Tr., pp. 63, 65) This 
written unconditional acceptance was not delivered to the 
defendants, however, until one month later, when it arrived 
by mail, on February 17, 1977. 
125) 
(Tr., pp. 15, 50, 99, 124-
Bryce Taylor acknowledged to Dean Hall that the accept-
ance was late, having been communicated orally after the five-
day time limit to the defendants' counter-offer had expired. 
(Tr., pp. 36, 124) Thus, he was anxious to see if the Andersons 
would recognize the plaintiffs', Norris's tardy unconditional 
acceptar.:::;2. Mr. Hall called Mr. Anderson, and told him that 
3ryce Taylor had orally informed him that the Norris brothers 
had changed their minds, and wanted to accept the defendants' 
counter-offer. (Tr., pp. 20, 112) Mr. Anderson responded 
-7-
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that there wasn't any counter-offer any more; that the 
counter-offer was dead. {Tr., p. 114) 
Because Mr. Anderson felt that his counter-of.fer to 
the plaintiffs, Norris, had expired, while at the same tilne 
Bryce Taylor was urging that he consider their late, uncontli-
tional acce~tance thereof, Dean Hall sought the advice of 
his broker, Mackey Boley. That evening {January is, 1977), 
after arrangements had been made to meet with the Andersohs 
on the follbwing day, Mr. Boley indicated that he also felt 
that the cot.inter-offer had expired. Mr. Boley, on his behalf, 
then had De~ Hall draft another offer to purchase the 
Ander~on prbperty for himself. {Exhibit "11"; .Tr., pp. 130· 
133) 
On Wediiesday morning, January 19, 1977, Dean Hall 
arrived first at the Andersons' home, and indicated that he 
had a second offer,· from Mackey Boley, to purchase the proper· 
ty. Bryce otaylor the~ arrived, and Mr. Hal 1 told him that 
there were how two offers to consider. {Tr., pp. 22; 37, 101, 
126, 135) Moments later, Paul Taylor, father of Br~c~ Taylor 
and broker of the plaintiff, Taylor National !teal Estate, 
" 
arrived and attempted to coerce the Andersoris into· agreeing 
to honor the late unconditional acceptanc:le of the d~fendants' 
\ 
counter-offer by L.K.L. Associates. Although Bryce Taylot 
had apparently brought the signed unconditional acdeptance 
{page two of Exhibit "2") with him to the meeting, it was 
never shown to nor left with Mr. Anderson. {Tr. , pi:>. 2 2, 
36-39, 48, l02-103, 105, 124-125, 139) The Boley offer w.is 
-8-
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withdrawn the same day. (Tr., pp. 129-130) 
Later that afternoon, Kim and Lanny Norris stopped by 
the Andersons' home. It was the first time the parties had 
f ever met face-to-face. The Norris brothers offered to 
meet or beat any offer made by Mr. Boley, and Mr. Anderson 
told them that he refused to enter a bidding situation, and 
that, if they had unconditionally accepted his counter-
offer within the time limited in it, they would have.bought 
the property. (Tr., pp. 22-24, 66-69, 72, 103-104) 
On February 16, 1977, plaintiffs then filed this action 
and, for the first time, mailed to the Andersons a copy of 
the fully executed unconditional acceptance of the defend-
ants' counter-offer (page two of Exhibit "2") by L.K.L. 
Associates (the Norris brothers) . The document was received 
by the Andersons on February 17, 1977, ~month after the 
purported unconditional acceptance thereof, which was the 
first time the unconditional acceptance, in writing, was 
ever seen by either the Andersons or Dean Hall (Tr., pp. 15, 
50, 99, 124-125), during all of which time, such purported 
written acceptance remained in the exclusive possession and 
control of the plaintiffs, with the power and opportunity in 
them to alter, amend, assert, or withhold as they saw fit. 
-9-
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• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDAf4TS' COUNTER-OFFER WAS REJECTED BY PLAINTIFFS' 
QUALIFIED ARD CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, AND COULD N0T BE 
REVIVED IN lTS ORIGINAL FORM BY A SUBSEQUENT ACCEPTANCE. 
It must first be remembered that the facts of this case 
must be vie~ed in the light most favorable to the judgment 
entered by the trial court, which is presumed to be correct; 
and that sudh judgment should be sustained, unless the eviden 
clearly pre~onderates against it. Stucki v. Stucki, 562 P. 
2d 240 (Utah 1977); Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P. 2d 393 (Utah 
1977); Oberffansly v. Earle, 572 P. 2d 1384 (Utah 1977). 
±t is ~lementary contract law that a binding contract 
can exist ottly where there has been mutual assent
1 
by the 
parties, maftife'sting their intention to be boUnd by its terms, 
Allen v. BiSsinger & co., 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 31 A.t.R. 
376 (1923); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P .. 2d 597 
(1962). Futthe;rmore, there is no liability to perfdfiti a 
spJcified a8t ciitil the person to whom an offer has.be~n 
made has acc~pted it according to its terms. 17 Am, Jur. 2d 
Coritracts § 32 (1964). 
When tlie plaintiffs first tendered their origihai offer, 
dated January 7, l91'f, its terms were so contrary tb the 
reciuirements of the listing agreement (Exhibit "l'i) ·that the 
defendant, Mr. Andeison, rejected it outright. C1'ri, PP· 13, 
95) That act terminated and destroyed plaintiffs' bffer, ~d 
the trial court so found. The Andersons then formulated theit 
seven-point counter-offer, which was signed, dated, and pte-
sented to Bryce Taylor, agent for the Norris btothers, on Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding f r digitization provided by t e Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Tuesday, January 11, 1977, thereby replacing the plaintiffs' 
original offer. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts§ 40 (1964). Thus, 
the defendants' counter-offer is the only viable. offer or 
counter-offer with which we are concerned in this case. When, 
therefore, on Friday, January 14, 1977, Kim L. Norris 
allegedly accepted five of the seven points of the defendants' 
counter-offer, but rejected two of the conditions specified 
therein, the defendants' counter-offer was thereby termina-
ted. The trial court specifically held that this qualified 
and conditional acceptance amounted to a rejection of the 
Andersons' counter-offer: 
Any words or acts of the offeree indicating that he 
declines the offer, or which justify the offeror in 
inferring that the offeree intends not to accept the 
offer or give it further consideration, amounts to 
a rejection •••• Likewise, the preparation of a 
new contract with different terms and provisions for 
consideration of the offerer is a rejection of his 
offer. An offer is rejected ~ a counter-offer, 
and in tiiTs-re5Pect ~qualified or conditional accept-
ance constitutes a counter-offer •••• (Emphasis added.) 
17 Am. Jur. 2d contracts§ 39 (1964). 
Th@ AO~@ptana@ of an offer which is necessary to create 
i ~ift~ifi~ 'C'Ofi~fa~t ~~uires mafiifestation of unconditional 
' . 
agreement to all of the terms of the offer, and intent ~o be 
bound thereby, and must not add any new material conditions 
thereto or deviate therefrom. R. J. Daum Constr. Co. v. 
Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P. 2d 817 (1952); Williams v. Espey, 
11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P. 2d 903 (1961). Here, where plain-
tiffs' qualified and conditional acceptance was specifically 
made subject to deletion of a SO-foot easement and subject 
!!_so to seller's acceptance of the second mortgage provision 
-11-
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contained ih the plaintiffs' original offer, and M.r. Anderson 
, 
adamantly refused to delete either point from his ~ounter­
offer ~ no m~l!!ting of the minds was reached, and, e<;ihsequently, 
the defendahts' counter-offer was rejected. 
As a r@sult of such rejection, the trial court specHi-
cally found that the defendants' counter-offer coul~ not, by 
a subsequen~ act of the rejecting offeree (L.K.L. Associates), 
be accepted in its original form: 
An off~r is terminated by rejection and cannot 
therealter be accepted so as to create a contract. 
Having pnce rejected the offer, the offeree dgnnot 
revive:it by tendering acceptance. (Emphasis· 
added.j 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 39 (1964). 
In Burttm v. Coombs, 557 P. 2d 148 (Utah 1976}, this 
Cotlrt held that, if an offer is rejected by refusal, ~­
' j! tidnal acceiplance, or by counter-offer, the party makintj the 
original od~r is relieved from liability, and the P,arty who 
rejected the offer cannot, of his own volition; create an 
agreement by his subsequent acceptance: 
. ' 
We hold~ therefore, ~ ~ matter of law, defenda~~s 
were nQt bound by an offer which had been un~qui~o­
cally iejected by plaintiffs and which had not been 
renewed prior to plaintiffs' subsequent attempt to 
effect an acceptance. (Emphasis added.) 557 P. 2d 
at 150. 
•.). 
Plaintiffs make some claim that there was a "firm and 
' !! 
absolute reri~wal" ot reinstatement by defendants of their 
original cottriter-offer on ~onday, Jantlary 17, 1977. There 
·is no competent evidence to support such ah assertion, and 
< 
the tri~l cotirt specifically so found. 
First, on Saturday I January 15 I 1971, wheh Br~/~e Taylor 
attempted to persuade the Andersons to delete the two points 
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of their counter-off er which the Norris brothers had found 
unacceptable, Mr. Anderson adamantly.refused to do so, and 
declared that the counter-offer had to be accepted by the 
Norris brothers exactly~ written. (Tr., pp. 16-17, 98-99, 
104-105, 111-112, 113, 121-122) 
Furthermore, on Monday, January 17, 1977, when Dean Hall 
called Mr. Anderson back to see how he felt about the plain-
tiffs' purported qualified and conditional acceptance of his 
counter-offer, Mr. Anderson still refused to bend on either 
of the two points of his counter-offer, and reiterated that 
he would only accept it as written and submitted. (Tr., pp. 
122, 137) Then, after Mr. Hall called back and lnformed him 
of Bryce Taylor's words, "The Norris brothers can do no more," 
Mr. Anderson told Dean Hall that the counter-offer had expired, 
and that the deal was off. Despite repeated and insistent 
q~estioning by plaintiffs' counsel (the identical issue 
having been previously raised by plaintiffs in their Motion 
to Compel Answers to Oral Interrogatories, which Motion was 
denied by the trial court), Mr. Anderson's clear and unequivp-
cal testimony is that, on Monday, January 17, 1977, he did 
not say that he would stand on the counter-offer. (Tr., pp. 
18-20) 
In the face of this unrebutted evidence, the trial court 
found that the communication back to Taylor was that the 
counter-offer as submitted was all that the Andersons would 
agree to. In its Decision dated February 14, 1978, the court 
held: 
-13-
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The plaintiffs' contention that conduct of the defend- I 
ants ijither by word or action extended the f1ve-day 
period on the counter-offer, ot in any manner consti-
tuted a waiver of that limitation, is without suppott I 
in thi evidence, and plaintiffs have failed ~prov! · 
these bontentions. (Emphasis added.) 
In li4ht of the foregoing, respondents respectfully 
submit that. the defendants' counter-offer was terminated and 
rejected by plaintiffs' qualified and conditional ~cceptance 
dated Januatr 14, 1977; that it was unequivocally.rejectetl 
on January 17, 1977, when Bryce Taylor informed the defentl· 
anls, thro\l~h Dean Hall, that "the Norris brothers can do rte 
mote"; ci:nd that it could not be revived in its original 
form by a pdtported subsequent acceptance. Burton v. coqffibs, 
supra. 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
POINT II 
THE COUNTER-OFFER OF DEFENDANTS EXPIRED BEFORE PLAINTIFFS 
PURPORTED TO ACCEPT IT. 
Plaintiffs next contend that their purported acceptance 
of defendants' counter-offer was made within the time limit 
prescribed therein. It is undisputed that all parties con-
cerned clearly understood the nature and consequences of 
that limitation. On Tuesday, January 11, 1977, at the Andersons' 
direction, Bryce Taylor himself, agent for the Norris brothers, 
drafted the language of defendants' counter-offer (Exhibit 
"2"), "Subject to buyer's acceptance within five days" {Tr., 
pp. 28-29, 41-42, 95-97, 119-120), and the Andersons affixed 
that date (January 11, 1977) to their counter-of£er. 
On Saturday, January 15, 1977, Mr. Anderson. told Bryce 
Taylor that the Norris brothers still had one day left before 
the expiration of the five-day limit on the counter-offer, 
and that he would honor his commitlllent until that time. 
(Tr., pp. 104-105, 113) When asked what he meant by that 
statement, Mr. Anderson specifically declared that the acceptance 
had to be within the five-day period. (Tr., p. 110) More-
over, when Kim and Lanny Norris stopped by the Andersons' 
home on Wednesday, January 19, 1977, Mr. Anderson told them 
that, if they had unconditionally accepted his counter-offer_ 
within the time limit, they would have bought the property, 
and each of the Norris brothers acknowledged that statement. 
~r., pp. 22-24, 66-69, 72, 103-104) 
It is clear, therefore, that apart from any considerations 
of rejection by the plaintiffs, Norris, of the defendants' 
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counter-offet, where the Andersons fixed a specific time 
limit of five days, within which time plaintiffs were 
required to accept their counter-offer, and at the same 
time dated sUch counter-offer, it expired by its owrl terms 
upon the 1ap9e of those five days without unconditidnal 
acceptanc~ thereof: 
The timn within which an acceptance must be made 
is corriUative with the duration of the offer •. An 
offereels power of acceptance continues until:tetmi-
natea ~Y acceptance or rejection or by any othet 
means r'garded as effective by law. The proposer 
may lin\lt the time for acceptance, since every person 
has the right to dictate the terms upon which J:ie· will 
contrac~, and ~ offer which specifies ~ time for 
its dur tion terminates £y the lapse of the t;lrlte 
s ec fi therein; the acceptance must take place 
within hat time ...• (Emphasis added.) 17 Am• Jur. 
2d Con acts----s-56 (1964). 
If the terms of an offer to buy or sell real estate 
stipula~e that the acceptance of such offer· is to 
be made within a certain time, it is esserttiali 
in order to constitute a binding contract; for. 
the off@res to comntunicate his acceptance :within 
the ticia stipulated; upon the lapse of ~ ~ 
the offlr terminates ipso facto, and acceetance 
thereaf er is of no legal effect. . • . (Emphasis added.) 
77 Am. Jur.~d--Vendor and Purchaser § 20 (1975) • 
I 
The UtaH statute regarding computation of time;. Utah 
Cod~ Ann. § ~8-3-7, prescribes: 
The ti~e in which any act provided by law is td 
be done'.is computed by excluding the firs~ q.._f{ . 
and including the last, unless the last is ~ hs1i-
day, and then it also is excluded. 
Thus, the defendants' counter-offer, dated Tu~Jday, 
January 11, l977, would have expired by its own terrllp five 
days later, dn Sunday, January 16, 1977. However, under 
Utah Code Antt. § 63-13-2, every Sunday is deemed to be a 
legal holiday. Therefore, the trial court found that 
-1.6-
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Sunday, January 16, 1977, was not counted, so that plain-
tiffs had through Monday, January 17, 1977, to accept the 
defendants' counter-offer, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8: 
Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than a 
work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by law or 
contract to be performed upon a particular day, 
which day falls upon a holiday, such act may be 
performed upon the next succeeding business day 
with the same effect as if it had been performed 
upon the day appointed. (Emphasis added.) 
The evidence is further undisputed that on Monday, 
January 17, 1977, when Dean Hall called Bryce Taylor and 
told him that Mr. Anderson refused to bend on either of 
the two points of his counter-offer, Mr. Taylor replied, 
"The Norris brothers can do no more." (Tr., pp~ 34-35, 47, 
122-123, 137-138) When Bryce Taylor's words were relayed 
back to Mr. Anderson, he told Dean Hall that the counter-offer 
had expired, and that the deal was off. (Tr., pp. 18-20) 
More importantly, on Tuesday, January 18, 1977, after the 
Norris brothers had purportedly accepted the defendants' 
counter-offer, for the first time unconditionally, Bryce 
Taylor himself acknowledged to Dean Hall that the acceptance 
was late. (Tr., pp. 36, 124) 
Finally, the evidence is clear that neither the Andersons 
nor Dean Hall ever saw or received the plaintiffs' purported 
acceptance in writing, dated Tuesday, January 18, 1977, until 
~month later, on February !2_, 1977, after thi:s lawsuit was 
filed, when they received it by mail. (Tr. , pp. 15, 50, 99, 
124-125) During that entire time, such purported written 
acceptance remained in the exclusive possession and control 
of the plaintiffs, subject to their power and opportunity 
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to do with !s they saw fit. 
In vie~ of this evidence, the trial court held that 
"The plaintiffs did not accept defendants' counter-'offer on 
the 17th of January, which was the 6th day after t)fo counter-
offer had bi:!en mad~ by defendants." Under the best view of 
plaintiffs' evidence, no acceptance was made until Tuesday, 
January 18, 1977, which acceptance was not conununicated ih 
writing to defendants until one month later. 
Mr. Andersbn clearly intended for his counter~offer lo 
expire within five days, and such provision must be constru~ 
in accordantie with the intention of the parties. 17 Arn. Jur, 
2d Contract~§ 329 (1964). Thus, even if the counter•offer 
was not terminated and rejected by plaintiffs' quapfied arld 
conditional .acceptance of Friday, January 14, 1977, it rtever· 
theless explted after five days by its own terms. 
The Nof~is brothers constituted Bryce Taylor as their 
agent to corl~ey their original offer to the defendan~s on 
January 7°, t~77, a,ntl, by so doing, also constituted.him as 
their agent lo receive, on their behalf, any acceptahde or 
. . 
rejection tH~teof or other response thereto. The delivert 
of the defertdants' signed and dated counter-offer to Mr. Taylor 
0Jl January ii I 1977 I ,Wai:i; therefore 1 tantamount tO delivery 
of the same to the Norris brothers (L.K.L. Associates) on 
: 
· that date, dhd the time limited therein for acceptance thereof 
comtnenced td run on the date of such delivery (Tuesday, 
January 11, l977). 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS NEVER PRODUCED A BUYER WHO WAS READY, WILLING, 
AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY ACCORDING TO THE 
TERMS OF THE LISTING. 
Without exception, every authority relied upon by plain-
tiffs in their brief states that a broker is entitled to a 
commission when he finds a buyer who.is ready, willing, and 
able to purchase, but only according to the terms specified 
in the listing agreement. On the other hand, a broker is not 
entitled to the compensation called for by his contract of 
employment until he produces a person who is ready, willing, 
and able both to accept and live ~ to the terms offered ~ 
his principal. Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 772, 20 
A.L.R. 280 (1921); 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers § 183 (1964). 
Such ability to perform by a prospective purchaser is 
defined as follows: 
••• [I]t is clear in general that the proposed pur-
chaser must have the legal capacity to purchase, 
in addition to having sufficient financial ability 
not only to make the initial payment required to meet 
the terms of the seller, but also to complete the 
contract of purchase according to its terms -- that 
is, to meet any deferred payments.--=-:-. (Emphasis added.) 
12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers§ 184 (1964). 
Even if plaintiffs were financially able to meet the terms 
specified by defendants, their offer never complied with such 
terms. The listing agreement, Exhibit "l", specified a 
total sales price of $250,000.00, with a down payment of 
$40,000.00, and terms for the payment of the balance to be 
negotiated with the seller. Bryce Taylor himself admitted 
that the plaintiffs' original offer, Exhibit "2", dated 
January 7, 1977, was not in conformity with those terms. 
-l,9-
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(Tr., pp. 40, 95) 
The Sai~s Agency Contract itself, Exhibit "lJ, entitles 
a broker to his commission, as cited in plaintiffs',brief 1 
only when hS procures a party ready, willing, and ~~le to 
buy "at the i>rice and ~ stated her~on, or at ~uch ~ 
price;~ tetjns to Which !.. may agree in writing. II ckmphaSiS 
added.) 
PlaintH:fs' offer pursuant to the said listin~ iagreentent
1 
dated Januaty 7, 1977 (Exhibit "2"), consisted of ?5,ooo.oo 
down and $1~,ooo.oo payable on January 30, 1977, which con-
stituted oni~ one-half of the down payment required by the 
',, 
listing agrd~ment. Such proposal was never agreed to by 
defendants. Instead, the first of the seven point~Qf 
their counte!f-offer (attached as page two of E}i:hibit "2") 
was, for $25;000.00 down. This counter-offer, as pte~ibusly 
disbussed ud~er Points I and II, supra, was first 
on January l~, 1977, by plaintiffs' qualified ~nd 
reje.tJted 
'· 
oondi tiohal 
ac:::c~ptance; ijxpired by its own terms after the ,laped of fi\re 
day~; and wa! expressi:Y and unequivocally rejedted; on January 
i ' ~ 
17;. 1977, by the words, "the Norris brothers can do ·no more. 
No· hnci:,onditibnal acceptarice was ever conununicated to lhe 
: t I 
def~ndants jrttil after January 17, 1977, and, in fact, was 
e~er deliver~d to the defendants in writing until orts'month 
f 
had elapsed. 
Plaintiffs' original, and all subsequent dffer~ thrbugh 
' ,, 
January 17~ 1977, were clearly at odds with the tehAs iiuthor-
' 
ized by deferldants, as sellers, in their listing agriiletnent. 
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Thus: 
Where a broker, instead of procuring a person who 
is ready, able, and willing to accept the terms his 
principal authorized him to offer at the time of--
his employment, procures one who makes a counter-
offer more or less at variance with that of his 
employer, the latter-is at liberty either to accept 
the proposed party upon the altered terms or to 
decline to do so, without giving the broker his 
reasons for the refusal. If he accepts he is 
legally obligated to compensate the broker for the 
services rendered, but if he refuses he incurs no 
liability therefor. In other words, if the prin-
cipal does not ~ fit to modify his original 
pro;rsals the broker can lay !!2.. ~ to his 
comillssions until he produces ~ person who Is 
ready, able, and willing to accept the exact terms 
of his principal. (Emphasis added.) 12 Am. Jur. 
2d Brokers§ 185 (1964). 
This Court addressed this precise issue in Hansen v. 
Snell, 11 Utah 2d 64, 354 P. 2d 1070 (1960). In that case, 
the listing agreement specified a price of $43,000.00 cash, 
followed by a recital in the seller's handwriting, "terms 
to suit the seller." The broker produced a prospective purchaser, 
but the seller demanded 10% interest on the deferred balance, 
to which the buyer refused to agree. The broker brought an 
action for his commission, which was awarded by the trial 
court. This Court reversed, holding that the seller could not 
be held to any commitmrnt othrr than the terms expressed in 
the real estate sales agency contract: 
••• The proposed buyer being unwilling to purchase upon 
the terms insisted upon by her [defendant seller], 
cannot be regarded as a willing purchaser under the 
contract she signed, and the plaintiff cannot compel 
her to pay his commission. 
This disposition of ~ ~ obviates the necessity 
of considering the plaintiff's claim that he ~ 
entitled to be awarded attorney's.fees under the prh-
visions in the contract. (Emphasis addecr:-y- rr-uta 
2d at 66-,-3~P. 2d at 1072. 
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• 
To the same effect, see, Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 376 ,(1951); 
sproui v. Parks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P. 2d 436 (1949;); Lynn Y.:. 
~· 
. J 
K.C. Ranches, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 3, 425 P. 2d 403 (1.967); 
;t: 
Clegg •· Le~, 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P. 2d 348 (1973)~ Weaver v. 
Modula, 557 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1976). 
In Davis v. Heath Dev. Co., 558 P. 2d 594 {Utah 1976), 
cited by plaintiffs in their brief, the listing agreement 
.. ll 
called for tt sales price of $400, 000. 00, to which ithe buyers 
counter-off~red $250,000.00. The Court refused td· ~ward cl 
commission lb the broker: 
• ~ .• Whei-1:! such a counter-offer of a lesser amo;,,_i).t is 
niade, the seller is at liberty to accept the 6~ter, 
but is under no obligation to do so; and if he 
tefuse8, he incurs no liability for the real est~te 
comntisSion. 558 P. 2d at 596. 
More recently, in Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P. 2d 1112 
(Utah 1977) i the defendants' letter authorizing sai~ fixed 
~ purchase ptice of $950,000.00, subject to approval of a 
.,I t 
specified irlsurance company, and separating th!!! "Denta1 
Building" from the transaction. The plaintiff brok~t:' present~ 
an Earne~t ~Oney Receipt and Offer to Purchaset offeting a 
price of $9~i,5oo.oo, subject to the insurance compahy's 
mortgage,· arid to a lease-back ll.greement by the sellers. the I 
plaintiff brt>ker brought an action for his comrliission1 and the, 
trial court tound for the defendant sellers. This C~Urt 
affirmed, detlaring: 
The law is well settled that the broker is not . 
entitled to a real estate commission untii he;ttas 
a written binding offer or agreement signed by• 
a ready~ willing and able purchaser. This means 
that a11 of the terms and conditions must, be aireed 
upon between the parties. Since all of the te.rns 
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~~agreed ~between ~ parties, no 
commission was earned. (Emphasis added.) """"'5"67 P. 
2d at 1114.-
In sum, plaintiffs never complied with the terms of the 
listing agreement, nor was the counter-offer of defendants 
accepted by plaintiffs according to the precise terms required 
therein. Because, therefore, plaintiffs never produced a buyer 
who was ready, willing, and able to meet the exact terms of 
the seller, they are not entitled to any real estate cornmis-
sion. Furthermore, under the authority of Hansen v. Snell, 
supra, they are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
under the provisions of the listing agreement or otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants' counter-offer was terminated and 
rejected by plaintiffs' qualified and conditional acceptance 
dated January 14, 1977, and it could not be revived in its 
original form by a subsequent acceptance. Thereafter, on 
Monday, January 17, 1977, the counter-offer expired by its 
own terms before plaintiffs purported to accept it, and was 
expressly rejected by the plaintiffs on that date. Because 
plaintiffs never complied with the exact terms of either 
the listing agreement or of the defendants' counter-offer, in 
producing a buyer who was ready, willing, and able to meet such 
terms, no contract was ever formed, and they are not entitled 
to any real estate commission, nor are they entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees under the provisions of the listing 
agreement or otherwise. 
Respondents respectfully submit that the judgment of 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
the trial cdi.irt was correct, and request that it be affirnled, 
V. PERSHING NELSO 
PATRICK B. NOLAN 
ALDRICH & NELSON 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I here~y certify that on the .~,/day of July, 1978, 
I mailed, pd stage prepaid, two copies of the foregoihg Brief 
of Respondertts to S. REX LEWIS and ROBERT C. FILLERUP, HOWARD, 
LEWIS & PETgkSEN, Attorneys for Appellants, 120 East 300 
North, Provd~ Utah 84601. 
:ZZ-L~ 
v. Pershing NelsoI)l 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
